Shared token vs dedicated account for Discloud least-privilege automation

Automating bot deployments on Discloud requires balancing convenience with the principle of least privilege. The platform authenticates API and CLI operations through a personal access token tied to the user's account, meaning any token held by an automation script inherits the full permission set of that account rather than a scoped subset for individual applications. This design creates a concrete constraint: a leaked or overprivileged token can manage all apps on the account, including restart, delete, and log retrieval actions, exceeding the intended access scope for single-bot workflows.

Token expiration and revocation currently manifest as 401/403 authentication failures, but no guaranteed stable error format exists across API versions, and exact scoping behavior and expiration policies may vary by plan and version. No documented per-application token mechanism is confirmed stable, and the discloud.config file is explicitly intended for app metadata only, not credential storage.

Is it possible to restrict a single Discloud API token to manage only a designated subset of applications within the same account? What API or dashboard features, if any, provide token scoping or granular permission boundaries? How should CI/CD pipelines handle token rotation when a shared account token is the only available credential?